1. The listing of the A-shares of the ship and the Taiwanese industry broke out, UMC: This is too heavy;
UMC will promote the listing of subsidiaries and ships in Shanghai Stock Exchange, so the market is worried about setting off a wave of Taiwanese companies. Liu Qidong, chief financial officer of UMC, said that this statement is "too heavy."
As for Hon Hai's Foxconn Industrial Fulian (FII) A-share listing, the honeymoon period is only 4 trading days, and it falls below the expert glasses. It is also worrying that the ship will repeat the FII. Liu Qidong stressed that the stock price is not the most important consideration. Listing in Shanghai is based on longer-term planning.
The UMC board of directors today decided that China's 8-inch wafer foundry subsidiary and the ship's 12-inch wafer foundry subsidiary Lianxin, IC design service plant subsidiary, and the ship-based application for the issuance of A shares, in Shanghai Securities Exchange listed.
Liu Qidong explained the reasons for promoting the listing of A-shares: First is the rapid development of the semiconductor industry in mainland China. The situation in the industry is very serious. The rate of brain drain of Hejian last year was as high as 15% to 20%. If it can provide an equity link reward The mechanism will definitely help retain talents.
Secondly, Lianxin has just started. Currently, working capital is mainly financed by local banks, and the debt ratio has approached 70%. If lower-cost funds can be obtained from the capital market, not only the financial structure will be significantly improved, but UMC can also leave funds. in Taiwan.
Liu Qidong stated that the promotion of the listing of A-shares is a regional layout of UMC. If this means that UMC has driven Taiwanese companies to go away, it is "too heavy."
According to the UMC plan, Hejian is expected to increase capital by 400 million new shares and raise RMB 2.5 billion to expand the capacity of 10,000 pieces of 8-inch wafers. It is expected to be completed in the second quarter of next year and improve the financial structure of Lianxin. Core monthly production capacity will increase from 15,000 pieces to 25,000 pieces.
Analyst Wang Zhaoli said that UMC's operating strategy adjustment in recent years has stopped chasing advanced process technology and is pursuing profit-oriented. Future capital expenditure will be dominated by China's Hejian and Lianxin. UMC promotes the ship's certification in Shanghai. The listing, the local funding, is conducive to the expansion of the ship and the core, and strengthen the cash flow of UMC.
Wang Zhaoli also said that UMC’s cash is more abundant and it would be a good thing for UMC shareholders to increase the dividends. According to UMC’s estimates, Hewa, Lianxin and Lianhe 3’s revenue accounted for about 11% of Umbro’s total revenue last year, and The ship was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the equity dilution was about 11%. The impact on UMC's performance was only about 1%.
2. UMC expands its mature process to give full play to its advantages;
UMC bought a 12-inch joint venture with Fujitsu, continued to expand the mature process map to stabilize profits, and planned to list the mainland subsidiaries and ships in the A-share market, and set up the mainland officially to actively support the semiconductor industry trains, sitting on funds, market and Talents, in addition to blocking SMIC's rush in the mainland, further attempt to squeeze out Grofund, and strive for the global foundry of the world.
Global advanced foundries lead the process, including TSMC, Intel, and Samsung, respectively. The advanced manufacturing process is unlikely to change much in the short term. The main reason is that advanced processes cost more than US$10 billion a year, capital war, and mature processes. The foundry industry can not compete with advanced process leaders even if it has technology and talents.
TrendForce estimates that in the first half of 2018, the world’s top five wafer foundry companies will be TSMC, Glofangd, UMC, Samsung and SMIC, and their market share (in terms of revenue) will be 56.1%. 9.0%, 8.9%, 7.4% and 5.9%.
The industry pointed out that although SMIC ranks fifth in the global foundry industry, with the United States attempting to block China's semiconductor industry, mainland officials are actively building local semiconductor plants and offering huge subsidies to SMIC, which is a worthy opponent. Therefore, Umbrella and its ships are listed on the mainland capital market, and in addition to raising funds, they will continue to expand their production capacity and expand their scale.
Industry analysis, Next, UMC must continue to expand the market share of mature process, in order to squeeze down the firm founding Ge Luofangde brother. Therefore, UMC took a joint venture with Fujitsu Semiconductor Japan 12-inch fab - Triple Fujitsu Semiconductor All equity, continue to expand production capacity.
There are no 8 factory equipments in the world. Even if they can be purchased, from the equipment to the mass production of the chips, I am afraid that it is not going to be anxious. I bought an old 12-inch plant and the equipment depreciation and amortization has ended. The efficiency is actually the highest. Economic Daily
3. UMC bought Fujitsu Semiconductor to highlight the dilemma of Japanese companies;
UMC will spend no more than 57.60 billion yen, taking a joint venture with Japan’s Fujitsu Semiconductor to become the sole owner of Mitsubishi Fujitsu Semiconductor (MIFS), a 12-inch wafer fab. This is another Japanese high-tech company’s sale after Hon Hai’s purchase of Sharp. Japan's high-tech industry has fallen into a development bottleneck.
Japan’s technology industry once led the world, but since the 1990s, it has turned from bad to bad. Not only is it facing strong competition from international companies, but also the loss of local technology and talents. The Nikkei news show that old-fashioned, short-sighted high-level corporate executives can’t resign. In addition, Japanese companies’ remuneration is not as good as that of their foreign counterparts, which is also an important reason for the departure of talents.
Nikkei has been working with Japanese traditional technology companies such as Toshiba, Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu and Sony. Engineers in these fields such as semiconductors and LCD monitors have already invested in South Korea, Taiwan or other foreign companies. One interviewee said: "This change occurred in the late 1990s. High-level executives have no big dreams. They just want to avoid risks. People who want to accept challenges are instead depreciated. Many missions go overseas to work, so that they can Talented environmental work."
In addition, remuneration is also the key to talent. Japan's tenured-employment culture adopts an annual payroll system. Even in the semiconductor industry, treatment and other companies are not far behind each other. Even if major technologies are developed and patented, rewards are awarded. Very meager, often discouraging these talented people; If compared with many other countries, such as U.S., Korea, etc., the Japanese engineers are even more frustrated.
Japanese companies’ short-sightedness in semiconductors and other industries is also a cause of decline. It will take a lot of investment in the early stages of these fields and it is difficult to guarantee that there will be profits. Many Japanese technology companies do not pay attention to these “emerging” industries. The personnel of these departments are rare. Promotion to senior executives.
The semiconductor or panel industry, unlike the long-term planning of power plants and infrastructure, can only speculate on the strategy for the next two to three years, and therefore requires different management skills. However, many senior executives do not understand the semiconductor industry. Lead to slow and even wrong development and investment decisions.
Miyamoto Shunichi, a professor at Central University of Japan who worked as a senior engineer in Toshiba's memory technology department, pointed out that as Samsung Electronics and other international competitors stepped up their pace, these conditions led to Japanese companies being jealous.
Another disadvantage of the Japanese semiconductor industry is that the government is not generous in terms of subsidies or tax concessions for new factories. The electricity and land prices are soaring, which also raises the cost of the electronics industry. The Nikkei points out that if Japan does not think about changes, including Globally advantageous industries such as automobiles, machinery, materials, etc. will be in trouble. In recent years, Toshiba and Fujitsu have been selling semiconductors one after another, which is the best vigilance.
4. Taiwan's semiconductor industry prototype 40 years ago breakfast will be finalized
According to the Industrial Technology and Economic Research Center (IEK) of the Industrial Technology Research Institute, the value of Taiwan's semiconductor industry chain reached NT$2.46 trillion in 2017, ranking third in the world, and it has become the leader in the field of professional foundry manufacturing.
This brilliance has to start with a breakfast report at a soybean milk store 44 years ago. In 1974, Taiwan was dominated by labour-intensive light industry, processing and export industries, and faced with mature industrial development, and the third world The rise of the country, with a lot of low-cost labor, Taiwan needs to find a turning point in the next generation of industries.
In February of that year, in the Xiaoxinxin Soymilk Shop in Nanyang Street, Taipei, he gathered Taiwan’s heavyweight political and financial figures, including Executive Dean Fei Wei, Economic Minister Sun Yunqi, Director of the General Administration of Communications Fang Xianqi, Minister of Communications Gao Yushu, Industrial and Research Institute Chang Wang Zhaozhen, Director of the Institute of Telecommunications Research, Kang Baohuang, and Pan Wenyuan, Director of the Research Institute of the United States Unlimited Wire and Electric Company (RCA), which develops the IC industry in Taiwan. They have breakfast and breakfast reports, and decided to integrate with Taiwan's industrial transformation direction. As a blueprint for industrial development, circuit technology outlines Taiwan's vision for transforming high-tech industries in the future, and decides to seek partners from the United States to introduce integrated circuit research and development, manufacturing, packaging and testing technologies to achieve timeliness.
Subsequently, Pan Wenyuan convened overseas scholars to form an Electronic Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) in the United States, and selected RCA as a technology transfer partner, selected to introduce complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology in integrated circuits, while working The Institute established the Electronic Industry Research and Development Center (later expanded to the Institute of Electronics) as the executive unit of the Integrated Circuits Program.
In April 1976, the 19-member team that had been recruited and trained went to the United States to bring IC technology back to Taiwan successfully. The success of the RCA program made it possible for society and people to discover that Taiwan has the ability to develop its own technology and then firmly transfer to high-tech industry development. Objectives. In October 1977, ITRI created the first integrated circuit demonstration plant in Taiwan to be completed and put into operation. Talents trained in the United States were sent back to the country for production R&D. The demonstration plant used a 7.5-micron process, and product yield was the sixth in operation. The monthly rate is as high as 70%, far higher than the 50% of the RCA of the technology transfer mother plant.
In order to industrialize the technology implementation technology, it was decided to establish the first semiconductor manufacturing company in China, Lianhua Electronics, in 1980, and transfer 4 wafer technology, as well as engineers from the Institute of Electronics Industry of ITRI. Assisted UMC in R&D and manufacturing, including Cao Xingcheng, who later served as chairman of UMC.
Later, the United States, Japan, South Korea and other countries saw that the impact of integrated circuits on national development was significant, and they actively invested in international protection technology. In 1984, ITRI took over the "VLSI" program and invested in R&D. Zhang Zhongmou, who served as the global vice president of Texas Instruments, served as the dean of the Industrial Research Institute. The first 6-inch integrated circuit experimental plant in Taiwan was completed in 1986, with the support of Zhang Zhongmou and the support of the then political councilor Li Guoding, 1987 Established Taiwan IC Manufacturing Company, transferred equipment and talents of VLSI plan to TSMC, and created a professional foundry model.
ITRI IEK
The Industrial and Industrial Research Center of Industrial and Industrial Research (IEK) is one of the important think tanks of the government. It is one of the important think tanks of the government. IEK's new vision for 2020 is to become an international think tank that leads Taiwan's industrial value creation, combining technology industry. Advantages of cross-cutting and system integration, propose and promote key issues in Taiwan's industry and technology development, in order to leapfrog national competitiveness and industrial added value.