The Toshiba Semiconductor sale that lasted more than eight months finally settled.
On June 1, Toshiba announced that it had completed the sale of its semiconductor company (TMC) and sold it to Pangea, the acquisition company formed by the Bain Capital led Japanese-American-Korean consortium. Although Toshiba owns 40.2% shares in Pangea, its major shareholder has already Easy Lord Bain Capital.
This was seen by Japanese media as another landmark event in the decline of Japan's semiconductor industry. According to IC Insights' list of the top fifteen largest global semiconductor companies (in terms of sales) released in the first quarter of 2018, Toshiba Semiconductor is the only remaining Japanese company. In the heyday of 1993, IC Insights released six of the top ten semiconductor companies in Japan.
What happened to the embarrassing rise and fall of the Japanese semiconductor industry?
Starting: From dependence on imports to independent research and development
The history of Japan’s Sony Corporation’s official website has been hung so far. One of the company's founders, Seo Shenda, conducted a three-month investigation tour in the United States in 1952. During this period, he heard that Western Electric Company (WE) intends to transfer transistor patents. But the price is as high as 25,000 US dollars, which is equivalent to 10% of the total assets of Japan's Tokyo Telecommunications Industry Corporation (Sony’s predecessor). Despite his longing for love, Jingshen eventually returned home with regrets. Another founder of Sony, Morita Shif, later in 1953 In the United States to negotiate, eventually won the technology.
However, they did not adopt the suggestion of WE to use the transistor as a hearing aid but to explore a brand-new application field. In 1955, Sony developed the world's first transistor radio. In 1959, Sony radio sales amounted to 2.5 million US dollars. .
Japanese companies followed suit. By 1965, Japan’s radio exports had reached 24.21 million units. In addition, electronic calculators and TVs have shaken the door to the US market.
The success of Japanese consumer electronics in the U.S. market is not only due to its product innovation and cost-effectiveness, but also related to U.S. policy. At that time, the U.S. shifted the focus of the electronics industry to military use, which provided Japan with opportunities for civilian electronic products.
By the 1960s, the Japanese semiconductor industry continued to catch up with the United States. At that time, the Japanese government adopted 'tariffs' and trade protection policies as the starting point of the industry's 'escort'. But foreign capitals began to 'give up' the door, finally in 1968, the United States Texas Instruments joint venture The model entered the Japanese market, but it must comply with strict technology transfer and other restrictions.
At that time, the localization rate of domestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japan was only 20%. The countermeasures in the United States made the Japanese semiconductor industry aware of its own passiveness. First, IBM announced in 1970 that it would use semiconductor memory in its newly introduced mainframe computer. Semiconductor memory has begun to replace magnetic cores, and DRAM memory chips occupying an important position in semiconductor memory have become a large market with unlimited potential. Overnight the industry has changed the rules of the game. Second, the United States has refused to provide IC integrated circuits to Japan, so that Japanese electronics The market share of calculators in the United States fell from 80% in the boom period to 27% in 1974.
As a result, Japan began to conduct its own research and development with the “power of the nation.” An R&D project for government-industry research has completely changed the status of the Japanese semiconductor industry. This project is a VLSI joint research initiated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Premier of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) of Japan. The slogan "Super LSI technology research portfolio" and "Made-in-a-Chip LSI" are also showing Japan's great ambitions. MITI will be the major competitors in the market (Fujitsu, Hitachi, The R&D personnel of Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba and NEC gathered together and invested a total of 70 billion yen. The government invested 29 billion yen (almost half of the subsidy expenditure of the then-produced province).
After the expiry of the above four years, more than 1,000 patents were obtained. The director of the VLSI Joint Research Institute, the principle set by Tsuikai Yasuu, known as the father of the Japanese semiconductor industry, may summarize the secret of success: Can competitors compete with each other? Is a big problem, then we will be based on 'basic, common' policy, starting from the common ground of all companies, to R & D, formulate future large-scale integrated circuit technology.
In the 1970s, Japan’s dependence on foreign key process equipment and production materials such as the United States reached 80%. By the early 1980s, the localization rate of semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japan reached more than 70%, laying the foundation for surpassing the United States to become the dominant semiconductor industry in the future. .
As a result, the Japanese semiconductor industry opened its 'golden age' and its global market share has continued to rise. It has begun to play a pivotal role in the world. Take the 64K DRAM that was put into the market in 1980 as an example. In 1981, Hitachi’s market share was the highest in the world. 40% share; Fujitsu second, 20%, NEC 9%. After that, NEC dominated the 256K era, Toshiba dominated the 1MB era. By 1986, the Japanese semiconductor companies in the global DRAM market share reached 80%, beyond the United States.
Japan's industrial development during this period relied mainly on exports. During the 15 years between 1970 and 1985, the output value of Japan's industry increased five-fold, and exports increased 11-fold.
The Turning Point: Behind Failing to Grasp the Scale of Opportunity
The blessings and blessings are the blessings, the blessings and the evils of life.
In the late 1980s, Japan’s DRAM market share began to decline sharply. The fundamental reason is that the DRAM market structure has undergone tremendous changes. Frequent trade frictions have also hindered the development of the industry to some extent.
Japanese companies have technical advantages in the memory used in early large-scale computers, and they value the quality of memory. But in the late 1980s, as the personal computer market thrived, the reliability and life expectancy of memory were lower, and more emphasis was placed on low prices. However, Japan was still using high reliability as a production standard and failed to adapt well to market changes.
Insiders pointed out that even though Japanese companies saw the trend of the personal computer market at the time, they were still clinging to the yield rate and were relatively lacking in cost reduction. Compared with Japanese and South Korean semiconductor companies, they found that Korean companies are significantly ahead of Japanese companies in terms of cost. , To produce the same components, the number of equipment used by Japanese companies was twice that of South Korea, and the production process was too long to reduce costs.
Another analysis pointed out that this is also related to the fact that Japanese manufacturers do not adopt the Fabless model. This development mode of the horizontal division of labor can enable specialized companies to focus on the design, OEMs focus on production, can respond quickly to market changes, and depreciate machines. The cost disadvantage is reduced to very low.
Most of Japan's semiconductor manufacturing is still a sub-department under a large group. Although individual products have good results, after the brand share reaches a certain level, the model can no longer effectively promote its semiconductor components to a next milestone. The Fabless model is the inevitable trend of the semiconductor industry under the development of economies of scale. Looking at the development model of Japan, it is not so much a market change as to say that semiconductor development has strong economies of scale as an operating support, while Japan has made Businesses have not been able to develop companies with corresponding business models and economies of scale, which has caused their competitiveness to be weakened. 'Lin Jianhong, research manager of Jibang Tuobei Industrial Research Institute, told the 21st Century Business Herald reporter.
In addition, Japan’s semiconductor industry has also been affected by external trade frictions. The continued rise of the Japanese semiconductor industry has increased the sense of crisis among American counterparts. This can be seen from media reports. In 1978, “Fortune” magazine published “Japan in Silicon Valley” The "Spy" report; In March and December 1981, two more reports published sounded the alarm bell for the US semiconductor industry. In 1983, "Business Weekly" magazine published an 11-page "Chip War: The Japanese Threat." Topics.
With the massive production capacity of Japanese manufacturers entering the market, a serious supply surplus has caused the global DRAM prices to plummet. In June 1985, the United States Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Trade Representative’s office for dumping semiconductor products in Japan; The U.S. Department of Commerce filed a 64K DRAM dumping lawsuit in Japan. The 'Japan-US Semiconductor Warfare' officially opened.
The war finally ended with the 'Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement.' The contents of the agreement mainly included improving access to the Japanese market and ending dumping. The United States accelerated its research and development efforts and successfully recaptured its throne. By 1993, U.S. semiconductor company’s share of the world returned to the world’s number one. One, and remain so far.
Due to the intensification of external trade frictions, Japanese companies began to transform their growth models driven by domestic demand. During the 15 years between 1985 and 2000, Japan’s electronics industry’s output value and exports increased 1.5 times, while domestic demand increased more than twofold.
In the early 1990s, Japan experienced a collapse of the bubble economy and entered a 'lost 20 years'. After 2000, Japan’s GDP growth stagnated, and Japan’s electronics industry has generally declined. In 2013, Japan’s electronics industry’s output value was 11 trillion yen. Less than half of the peak (26 trillion yen).
At the end of the 1980s, Japan’s economy reached the second place in the world. The United States used the Plaza Accord and the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement to exert pressure, which significantly weighed on the profitability of Japanese companies. South Korea has taken the national power to develop the semiconductor industry. After Japan’s economic bubble burst, subsidy could hardly be maintained. “Display and semiconductor industry consulting firm CINNO deputy general manager Yang Wende told 21st Century Business Herald that the development of the semiconductor industry is closely related to the macroeconomic situation of a country because it is extremely capital intensive. The industry needs to be sustained and large-scale capital investment will be successful. When the overall economy of a country is sluggish, it will be difficult to support its development.
Reinvigoration: Structural Reform and Relaunch of 'Official Industrialization' Project
Japan's semiconductor industry tried to reinvigorate it with structural reforms and restarting the 'government and industry-produced' project.
Under the guidance of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in 1999, the DRAM divisions of Hitachi and NEC incorporated Elpida, Mitsubishi Electric subsequently participated, while other Japanese semiconductor manufacturers withdrew from the general DRAM field. Resources are concentrated in fields such as system integration chips with high added value. Elpida is the Greek word for 'hope' and this company name reflects the high hopes of the Japanese semiconductor industry for this last DRAM maker.
Helplessly, the 'outside world' is changing rapidly. After the financial crisis in 2008, global demand plummeted and DRAM supply was severely oversupplied. 2GB of DRAM was priced above $20 in 2008 and below $1 in 2012. Global DRAM Producers are falling into a serious deficit, and Elpida is no exception. The Japanese government extended a helping hand in 2009 and injected funds to secure Japanese policy investment banks for its guarantees.
But after all, it was hard to come by. Elpida's unbearable debt finally declared bankruptcy at the end of February 2012, and was acquired by Micron in July 2012.
A Japanese semiconductor practitioner told a 21st Century Business Herald reporter that natural disasters have a certain impact on the development of the semiconductor industry in Japan. The 3·11 earthquake has accelerated the decline in the competitiveness of Japan’s semiconductor industry.
'Our company also suffered heavy losses in the earthquake, the stock price has been falling all the way, until the first two years of reorganization and reconstruction of the factory to restore normal production. Stock prices have also tripled. Semiconductor production is environmentally demanding, to clean and stable environment Can produce excellent products. ' The Japanese semiconductor industry said.
However, some analysts pointed out that Elpida's failure is the same mistake that Japan's semiconductor industry made, which cannot keep up with changes in the industry. The last time it failed to keep pace with the rise of the personal computer market, this time it was unable to keep up with computers and smart phones and tablets. Turn to.
'Japanese companies are generally skilled in delving into technology, but they are less responsive to changes in the outside world because they are generally more bureaucratic and have slow decision-making processes. The results of the past 30 years have actually been achieved without external rivals. When faced with more competitors, this kind of focus but slow response weakness will be amplified. 'Yang Wende said.
Japan initiated a number of government-produced programs, including the Asuka program, future plans MIRAI, HALCA, etc. In 2006, Japan introduced a new five-year plan, which is considered as a continuation of the ASUKA program. The new five-year plan is divided into two parts. : First, SELETE five-year R&D project, with an annual investment budget of 10 billion yen, exploring actual application processes at 45 and 32 nanometers. The other part is STARC's five-year research and development plan with an annual investment budget of 5 billion yen for the development of the DFM design platform. .
Although the glory of the Japanese semiconductor industry has become history, and the current global market share has been less than 10%, it still plays an important role in some segments.
'Japan's scientific capabilities and manufacturers in materials, precision machinery, basic physical chemistry mathematics, etc. are still influential. Accumulated patents and professionals in history are still very strong. As long as the capital and the company's operating model are correct, if we can grasp By the next wave of major commodity shifts, Japan’s semiconductor industry will still be very competitive. ' Lin Jianhong said.
'Semiconductor is an integrated industry. The production of a chip requires the workload of nearly 10,000 people. At the same time, it takes many years of experience to accumulate innovation. The Japanese semiconductor is very deep and may currently develop slowly, but its foundation is still , To look at the country after the investment in the semiconductor industry. 'The above semiconductor industry in Japan said.