The story of the semiconductor industry: How the Taiwan semiconductor industry took off

In 1949, after three years of civil war, the Nationalist government was defeated by Taiwan, and the political and academic circles set off a large-scale reflection. Why did they fail in the civil war? When reflecting on economic policies, public opinion accused the National Government of 'developing state capital', ' "Control of private capital," but it is to create excuses for rent-seeking. The consequences of economic regulation is that small and large officials are full of self-serving, corruption, and they have made the anger and resentment.

In March 1954, Hu Shi publicly introspected the mistakes of intellectuals in “Free China”, “All planned economy... Is it not in conflict with freedom?”, to confess for supporting the planned economy in the mainland. Although Chiang Kai-shek was silent on the surface, , a 'no argument' attitude, but in fact ordered the staff to re-interpret the meaning of the so-called 'controlling private capital' and 'developing state capital' in Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, to open up the mind for the liberation of minds. In March, with the acquiescence of Chiang, Chen Cheng, the actual politician in Taiwan at the time, publicly stated:

The government has now deeply felt that in order to fully develop the economy, we must have a basic condition, that is, to protect private property, expand corporate freedom, and open up a flat and broad outlet for private capital. In the future, the government will not only need to modify and hinder corporate freedom. All kinds of laws and regulations, as well as planned and step-by-step procedures, will allow private enterprises to open up as many private enterprises as possible. This is a policy issue and it is also a concept issue.

This is the beginning of Taiwan's economic development and recovery. It is also the basic core of Taiwan’s industrial policy, and it is dominated by private economy. If there is no preparation for economic liberalization at the very beginning, the national government’s desire to establish itself in Taiwan is simply ridiculous, and Taiwan’s economic development is also fundamental. There is no way to talk about it.

At that time, Taiwan’s economic affairs was dominated by Yin Zhongrong, a technical bureaucrat. He was responsible for the privatization and liberalization of Taiwan’s economy at that time. Yin Zhongrong never participated in any party in his life. To a certain extent, there was a feeling of traditional Confucianism that was used by the world. The resistance to advance privatization is enormous. He once said to his classmates.

'The country has never stopped, my generation is 50 years old, as long as we can work hard, and then do another decade, although the death has continued to name.'

In 1963, Yin Zhongrong died of acute hepatitis and had no financial resources. In the days before his death, Yin Zhongrong was still discussing the fiscal and tax issues with Zhang Jiuru. He felt that:

"I only took less than half a step, and others blamed me for hitting him."

In 1955, although Yin Zhongrong, who was also the Minister of Economy, Industrial Committee, and Director of the Central Trust Bureau, was deeply trusted by Chiang Kai-shek, it was because of the counterattack of the vested interest group that he was caught in the “Yangtze Timber” case. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek personally stepped in and allowed the wind to pass. The Public Prosecutor’s Office hopes that it will not implicate Yin Zhongrong. The result is still not stopped. Chiang Kai-shek is furious and writes in the diary.

'With the remarks of Xiu Yin and Hu's case, quasi their appellate policy, to the legislature, to monitor the unscrupulous members of the two courts, and to defy the warning...

Although Yin was the second-instance suspect, he was still at home for two years. During this time, Yin Zhongrong did not ask about the world. He wrote Guo Xiaotao's chronicle and often used the self-excited “Ze Ke’s legacy” in Lu’s Spring and Autumn Period. spirit.

After returning, Yin Zhongrong made an extraordinary effort to reform the foreign exchange and changed the 'double exchange rate' to 'single exchange'. In 1960, Yin Zhongrong took the U.S. aid, foreign trade, financial power, and called the 'economic tsar'. In the same year, Taiwan finally came from the 'budget'. Balanced ', 'pursuing economic development', to 'economy begins to take off'.

After the privatization reforms, the Taiwan region began to form an economic structure dominated by small and medium-sized private enterprises. In the mainland, the KMT, with its messy economy, finally handed over a good transcript in Taiwan. In the 1950s, Taiwan’s industry The average growth of production, export value, and GDP was already 11.9%, 22/1%, 8.1%; in the 1960s, it increased to 16.5%, 26%, and 9.7%.

After Taiwan's economic development, this idea was also continued. Government officials used industrial policies to strongly promote economic restructuring while adhering to the privatization strategy.

In the debate on industrial policy, Zhang Weiying and Lin Yifu proposed two reasons for opposing industrial policies: cognitive dilemmas and incentive dilemmas. The so-called cognitive problem means that officials must make market judgments in advance and formulate correct industrial policies; The question of incentives is why officials should formulate the correct policies for economic development instead of rent-seeking, realizing their powers and seeking private interests.

In the discussion of industrial policy, Chen and Chen mentioned the concept of national capacity. The main point is that the bureaucratic system can independently and independently formulate industrial policies that are truly conducive to economic development, and it is not kidnapped by external interest groups, but can also be coordinated from top to bottom. The interests of all parties, promote the implementation of industrial policies.

The formation of these ideal conditions is often extremely difficult, but Taiwan’s main technical bureaucrats in the period of economic transition: Yin Zhongrong, Li Guoding, and Sun Yunzhen have indeed idealized temperaments.

When answering the cognitive dilemma and incentive dilemma, they delivered a good historical answer. For the cognitive dilemma, extensively refer to market opinions, keep trials and errors, hatch new industries, promote privatization, respect entrepreneurship and market laws. .

For the issue of incentives, the special historical era, the use of traditional scholars' sentiments of the world has become their method of self-motivation.

Taiwan’s economic expert Ruan Wanwen’s “The Origin of Taiwan’s Postwar Economic Development” stated that the most important issue in the development of the country is the issue of incentives, that is, the question of why officials have developed. He believes that the success of Taiwan’s transformation has been largely attributed to the Financial officials, he is not a simple technocrat, but under the Confucian tradition of China, with the scholars of the “revolutionary economy and the people”. Wan Wanwen is willing to call them 'religious officials who save the country by industry'.

Lee Kok-ting, who promotes the development of Taiwan’s semiconductors, is a typical example. Li Guoding has a deep feeling of family life. He often occupies the “lonely minister”. His grandfather leaned in the Xiang Army and also received a speech from Zuo Zongtang. Hundred City Books'.

Li Guoding graduated from the Physics Department of Nanjing Central University in 1930. He received a compensation payment from the Central University of Nanjing, entered Cambridge to study nuclear physics, and the anti-Japanese war broke out in 1937. He had not yet graduated, and he decided to return to the country to participate in the war. He became a small mechanic in the prevention and control school. 1948辗, 辗, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,.

In 1964, after extensive investigations in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Italy, Lee creatively proposed to establish a processing and export zone in Kaohsiung. After the proposal was implemented in 1965, it greatly promoted Taiwan’s export-oriented economic development model. Later, it became even more rampant. global.

Thanks to Taiwan’s cheap and well-trained labor force, a large number of European and American companies began setting up factories in Kaohsiung. Around 1970, Texas Instruments set up a packaging and testing plant in Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone in Taiwan. At that time, Zhang Zhongmou, a vice president of Texas Instruments Li Guoding and Sun Yunzhe dealed for the first time. Financial officials such as Li Guoding were practical and economical in developing their economy. The spirit of hard work and dedication left a deep impression on Zhang Zhongmou. This is why 15 years later, when the Taiwanese side invited 54 years old, Zhang Zhongmou returned to Taiwan to help develop the semiconductor industry, an important reason for Zhang Zhongmou’s heartbeat.

Although Zhang Zhongmou returned to Taiwan in 1985, and two years later, he created TSMC. However, the birth of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is to be more than twisted.

On February 7, 1974, at Xiaoxinxin Soybean Milk Store in Huaining Street in Taipei, Sun Yunjun from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Fei Yan, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, Wang Zhaozheng, Director of the Industrial Technology Research Institute, and Pang Wenyuan, Director of the RCA (American Radio Corporation) Research Office, shared breakfast. Will, proposed a plan for the development of semiconductors. The conference became a legend with the success of Taiwan Semiconductor.

After that, Taiwan invested 10 million U.S. dollars as the starting capital for the development of IC. In September, the Institute of Electronic Industry Research and Development in Taiwan was established. This decision can not be regarded as an independent decision of the technocrats. In fact, this is the government and As a result of extensive overseas Chinese expert interactions, overseas Chinese were called in October to set up an electronic technical advisory committee in the United States to participate in the assessment of the strategic direction of technology transfer.

At that time, Li Guoding set up a scientific and technical advisory committee, widely consulted with the academic circles and entrepreneurs, incited criticism, and allegations of interest transfer were heard. Chiang Ching-kuo asked Li, What is a semiconductor? Li answered, I don't know. Chiang Ching-kuo asked Li Guoding to make it clear. Li Guoding insisted, It is because we don’t understand that we need to set up a scientific and technological advisory committee and we have finally been recognized by Chiang Ching-kuo.

Taiwan has established plans to introduce semiconductors (especially consumer semiconductors, especially electronic ones) from overseas. The company has invested US$3.5 million and more than 40 researchers have gone to the U.S. RCA to study. It has introduced a full range of technologies, circuit design, and mask manufacturing. , Wafer manufacturing, packaging and testing technology, also includes production management, and the agreement stipulated that RCA must repurchase the product. At that time, the ITRI set up a pilot plant to use the technology on ICs needed to produce electronic watches. With rates exceeding RCA, Taiwan was once one of the top three export regions for electronic watches.

In 1980, Taiwan’s ITRI Electronics established UMC. Since Taiwan is dominated by small and medium-sized companies, semiconductor risk is too high. Private enterprises are reluctant to invest. Government initiative investment accounts for 70% of the shares, and private enterprises account for 30%.

Around the 1980s, regarding the role that the government should play, Taiwan’s famous “Chief of the Chiang Kai-shek” broke out — Jiang Shuojie and Wang Zuorong. Wang Zuorong advocated that the government should take a more active role and must be led by the government like Japan. Jiang believed that the government should provide an economic system suitable for capital accumulation and investment environment and oppose the authorities’ choice of leading industries.

'The views of government officials are not necessarily correct. They can't force people to go in a certain direction. Private entrepreneurs have more accurate observations, freedom to give ordinary people free choice. Which industries are considered to be strategic industries, promising industries? , give rewards, others do not reward, this is not right '.

From the perspective of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry at that time, both parties said that it was reasonable. In 1983, Taiwan Electronics Co., Ltd. imitated Japan, invested 70 million U.S. dollars, and launched a VSLI super large-scale integrated circuit project, attempting to achieve cross-development through mastering DRAM and SRAM technologies. As a result, after the development of the technology, it was discovered that he did not have manufacturing capabilities.

For a long time, most foreign companies have set up factories in Taiwan to collect and test. Taiwanese local manufacturers do not have manufacturing capabilities. Unlike Korean companies' long-term manufacturing capabilities in semiconductors, they can quickly manufacture chips after successful technological development. The same is true for the first force in the manufacturing process, and finally it turns into a technological advantage.

Taiwan made early bets, and the expensive technology developed into a castle in the air can only be sold to Japan's Fujitsu, Jiabao and Hyundai.

However, this setback made Taiwan aware of its own defects. The electronics industry was forced to build a factory that could produce 6-inch wafers. The factory was completed in 1986. At that time, Zhang Zhongmou, who was in charge of the ITRI, proposed to the factory. Taiwan's semiconductor industry, should take the road of OEM.

The semiconductor integrated circuit industry can be roughly divided into three parts: design, manufacture, and packaging and testing. When Japan dominates the semiconductor market, it is the IDM model that integrates design, manufacturing, and packaging and testing. This model is in the early stages of semiconductor development. Is very competitive. At that time, Japanese companies insisted that

'The design department and the production department must belong to the same company. This is because the design department and the production department need to communicate closely, share information, and if they can do it, they can't make excellent products'.

However, with the expansion of the semiconductor market, the realization of large-aperture wafer fine processing, the rapid increase in production costs, the Japanese-style IDM business vertical mode began to have drawbacks. Due to the large-scale investment in the purchase of production equipment, it will produce a large number The fixed depreciation costs, so must have a large number of orders to amortize the cost. However, due to market fluctuations, IDM-based semiconductor companies often face a dilemma:

'The investment amount is proportional to the sales amount and the depreciation expense is inversely proportional to sales'.

In simple terms, when the market is booming, the sales of the company will be very good, but at this time, it will need to invest in buying a lot of expensive production equipment. However, once the market is sluggish, the sales decline, a large number of production equipment previously purchased However, it will generate a large amount of depreciation expenses, which will further impair corporate profits.

In fact, this idea did not come out of thin air, but was the result of long-term market observations by entrepreneurs. As early as when Zhang Zhongmou worked at Texas Instruments, he discovered that although Texas Instruments first invented the integrated circuit, it mainly relied on the production of IBM. Orders to survive. In the eyes of Zhang Zhongmou, that is the prototype of OEM.

After returning to Taiwan, Zhang Zhongmou noticed that there are more than 50 IC design companies in the United States. Actually, they do not have their own manufacturing plants. They can only place orders for Japanese IDM manufacturers. However, Japanese manufacturers must be prioritized themselves, and they cannot get goods in time. The issue of technical confidentiality is involved, and OEMs do not have this problem.

At that time, Nvidia was still a start-up company focused on chip production. It was simply unable to afford the cost of building its own production. When Huang Renxun was overwhelmed by this, when he received a phone call from Zhang Zhongmou, he was overjoyed to let people around him.

'Quick and quiet! Morris (Zhang Zhongmou) called me.'

Although the business model is feasible, in the early stage, TSMC’s venture capital was a big problem. Fortunately, Li Guoding and others supported it strongly. The Executive Yuan’s development fund invested 48.3%. However, the Taiwan authorities insisted on privatization, and the foreign-owned Philips out 27.5%. Only 24.2% of Taiwan’s private citizens took a wait-and-see attitude.

Although Taiwan’s industrial policy has actually experienced setbacks, the $70 million R&D fund is a huge loss. However, without the continuous promotion and trial and error of the ITRI, it is difficult to imagine that UMC and TSMC could be born.

Although the foundry's factory was built, there were not many market orders. At that time, the mainstream Japanese companies adopted the IDM model, and the orders were naturally close to their own production plants. As a start-up company, TSMC was behind the production equipment and manufacturing capabilities. There are only a few non-mainstream IC design companies that can be connected to this list. This is why the Japanese companies cannot afford to see OEMs at first.

At this time, Zhang Zhongmou’s position in the semiconductor market began to play a role again. In 1988, Zhang Zhongmou and Dike, whom he had dug from the General Semiconductor Department, contacted Rudolph, the old friend’s president Rudolph, through personal relations. At that time, he had learned that Rudolph. To lead the company's transformation, allinCPU, he guessed that Rudolph must concentrate on design, so he hopes to get Intel's orders.

Rudolf is still willing to listen to Zhang Zhongmou's words, because Zhang Zhongmou was the first to defeat Intel in the memory market. In 1972, the 47-year-old Zhang Zhongmou became the vice president of Texas Instruments, responsible for the semiconductor business. At that time, Intel was the first in the 1K memory market. Zhang Zhongmou made a 4k memory bet on R&D to gain technical advantages. He also made price reductions and cut prices regularly. That is, each time the company launched a new product, it reduced its price by 10% per quarter and regained the first place in the memory market. Since then, Intel No longer returning first in the DRAM memory market.

When Rudolph sent someone to inspect TSMC's products, he found that the quality was not good. The semiconductor production process had more than 200 procedures. There were also more than 200 issues that Intel discovered. Almost every process had problems. Zhang Zhongmou's execution is very powerful. After more than a year of improvement, TSMC finally got Intel's orders.

Zhang Zhongmou said, 'Intel designed a CPU is very powerful, but the production of CPU is not powerful, my cost is half his, my quality is twice as good as his, I can help you to OEM'. With Intel's reputation endorsement The OEM model gradually became accepted by mainstream manufacturers. The market gradually discovered that at the time of delivery in Japan for 12 weeks, Singapore for 6 weeks, and TSMC for only 4 weeks, the efficiency was extremely high. TSMC’s reputation was rampant.

Although the Taiwanese government has vigorously fostered and nurtured the semiconductor industry, it has not restricted internal competition. At that time, a large number of semiconductor manufacturers in Taiwan had been transformed into OEMs due to the driving effect of TSMC. In 1980, the ITRI’s e-book was also published. The founding of UMC's transitional foundry foundry, and TSMC's fierce competition, Yu Shiliang.

UMC was founded by the ITRI, and Cao Xingcheng was appointed as the general manager. After that, Zhang Zhongmou returned to the office of dean, not only the chairman of TSMC, but also the chairman of UMC. However, in 1991, Cao Xingcheng cited the conflict of interest as the reason. Accusing Zhang Zhongmou toward TSMC, and dismissing Zhang Zhongmou’s chairman, the two formally broke. Afterwards, Cao Xingcheng always claimed that the foundry model was something he had come up with in 1984. The trustee also brought Zhang Zhongmou a plan, but Zhang never directly responded.

In 1995, due to insufficient production capacity of TSMC, customers were required to pay a deposit in advance, causing dissatisfaction; Cao Xingcheng took the opportunity to take the lead in the transformation of wafer foundry, followed by TSMC to grab a list. After transitioning out, there was MediaTek. Afterwards, Cao Xingcheng was also a joint venture, up and down vertical. Integrate upstream design companies and downstream packaging companies to provide manufacturers with OEM services throughout the industry chain.

In 1997, another Zhang Zhongmou, an old affiliate of Texas Instruments, was founded by Zhang Jianjing, the founder of the plant, and became the third foundry in Taiwan to participate in this competition. In 2000, The world’s largest company has just achieved profitability. Zhang Haojing is preparing to flex its muscles.

At this time, Zhang Zhongmou had a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, he took the salary from the bottom, took advantage of Zhang Dajing to buy it from the World Bank, and once again pulled away from Taiwan Union Power. On the other hand, TSMC has demonstrated amazing technical strength in the competition, and developed the 0.13 micron process. After beating Taiwan Power, it has remained at the leading position.

Afterwards, the out-going Zhang Yujing went to SMIC, which was founded on the mainland. Cao Xingcheng also had technical support, but it also caused political incidents on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to be completely eliminated.

TSMC not only competes internally, but also competes fiercely with Samsung and Intel on the manufacturing process. After Apple's strong rise, around 2011, TSMC took advantage of advances in manufacturing technology to grab Apple’s order from Samsung’s hands. Apple Supply Chain. In May 2017, with the advantage of OEM model, TSMC’s market value was once more than Intel’s.

Because the Taiwanese economy is dominated by SMEs and fears investment risks, the government has to strongly promote economic transformation, but it can take the initiative to adjust mistakes in the transition, rely on entrepreneurs to control the market and business model innovation, adhere to privatization, and promote enterprises. The development in competition is the fundamental departure of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan.

At this point, the story center of semiconductors was transferred to mainland China.

2016 GoodChinaBrand | ICP: 12011751 | China Exports