In the micro-message news, Hon Hai re-clarified today that “the company and ZTE have no business dealings and will not be affected.” According to the annual report of ZTE Corporation, the company’s own manufacturing line, mobile phone design and manufacturing are more self-produced, with only key components and Semi-conductor process production and procurement of semiconductors.
2. US embargo chip rethinking: nurturing high-end industries based on the domestic market;
Author: Chinese Academy of Engineering, Guo-Jie Li
Recently, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s ban on resurgence of ZTE’s papers has almost killed Zhongxing. The reason behind this is self-evident: China is still subject to control over many key components and core technologies. ZTE Corporation is also located outside the United States. It is difficult to find alternatives.
The US embargo on chips is definitely not aimed at a company of ZTE. In the future, it is possible to expand the scope of the embargo. Huawei's current investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice is a clear testimony. This has a great impact on China. Currently, although the country can already produce Some chips, including general-purpose CPUs represented by Loongson and Haiguang, still accounted for more than US$260 billion in chip imports last year.
The level of design and manufacturing of high-end chips can represent the overall technological level of a country. Frankly speaking, the manufacturing level of domestic chips has a gap of more than two generations from abroad, and the gap has not narrowed in recent years.
The biggest problem is that we have not yet mastered the initiative to close the gap. If we grasp the initiative, after years of hard work, the gap can be narrowed down to the first generation or even tied in. It is only a matter of time before the gap is smoothed. Unfortunately, this initiative is not in our hands.
The reason is not which chip company does not work hard, but because the integrated circuit is the most basic industry in the information field. The gap in chip strength is not a gap between two technologies, from chip processing equipment, simulation software to supporting various IPs (knowledge (property rights) and so on need to accumulate over a long period of time before they can make progress. It does not mean that as long as the country is willing to invest money, it can immediately see the effect with hundreds of billions of yuan.
In addition, at present, China's chip and software vendors need to support R&D projects rather than R&D projects. Instead, we try and improve them. Our experience with Loongson CPUs is that the most difficult thing is not to be inferior to people, but to make products difficult to find. The core technology and key products are constantly being tried and iterated in the application, and it is not always an unknown - both chips and operating systems. Microsoft's operating system is also perfected by playing 'patch' based on user feedback.
Therefore, our country should respond to the policy of preferential procurement of core products for domestic R&D production. We often hear integrators and application departments say: 'When domestic chips are done as good as foreign ones, I will use you.' Take this attitude Absolutely cannot support the development of the domestic integrated circuit industry.
For a long time, our country’s scientific research and industrialization have entered such a vicious cycle: Foreign monopoly or embargoes – China has developed alternative products – Foreign price cuts and suppression – Our country has given up support – Maintaining or expanding the gap. Often foreign countries have strict control over us. We attach importance to independent research and development; once we relax abroad, we will relax, lack of strategic vision and strategic determination.
For the support of key technologies such as key chips, the country must have a strong strategy. To maintain long-term stable support, the policy can not be swung. High-end chips, large-scale software, aero-engines, and precision instruments are very complex systems and require long-term accumulation of experience. , Improvements from generation to generation. When new products begin trials, it must be a matter of trial and error. Exposing problems is a good thing. Don't see problems before you get rid of them, or sloppy change the technology route. We must believe that after the hard work, problems will surely increase. The less.
At the same time, we may need to understand the trial opportunities for independent products and the initial market from a higher perspective. Looking at the world today, almost all developed countries import low-end products and export high-end products. Throughout the world, Late-developing countries move from low-end products to high-end products. Few countries have used the domestic market to protect and cultivate their own products. Germany and the United States have surpassed the United Kingdom, and Japan’s Meiji Restoration has adopted a tariff protection policy.
Under the situation that China’s accession to the WTO has now become a banner for promoting globalization, we cannot repeat the old methods of protecting national industries through customs duties in history. However, relying solely on the so-called “fair competition” of companies in the world, it depends entirely on the market. With hands, it is impossible to achieve a backward country from the low end of the industry to the high end. It is necessary to rely on the government hand to open up a market in the country as a base area to nurture and develop key industries that determine the fate of the country.
Of course, the situation in which the core technology is controlled by people is unlikely to change immediately. Everyone must have a clear understanding of the long-term nature and arduous nature of developing core technologies, and at the same time have enough patience, perseverance, and confidence in supporting China's information industry from the low to the high end. .
If we can use the embargo on ZTE to further strengthen our country’s determination to cultivate high-end industries based on the domestic market, then bad things will become a good thing. This will certainly greatly accelerate China's process of becoming a technological power with safe control through independent innovation. Journal of Science
3. The history of the semiconductor industry in Korea: The government promoted Samsung's death;
In 2017, the semiconductor industry created a new record.
George Brocklehurst, director of research at Gartner, an international research organization, said that this record is Samsung’s push to squeeze Intel’s lead in global semiconductor revenue. Intel’s 25-year history as the “world’s largest factory” since 1992 has given way. Gartner's latest statistics show that in 2017, global semiconductor revenue totaled 420.4 billion U.S. dollars, an increase of 21.6% from 345.9 billion U.S. dollars in 2016.
In addition, according to statistics from IC Isights and other agencies, from the point of view of revenue, South Korea holds two seats among the top three semiconductor companies in the world, and Samsung and SK Hynix are ranked one and three respectively. Samsung, SK Hynix in 2017 Significant increase in revenue is mainly related to higher prices caused by shortage of chips.
Since Samsung established a semiconductor research and development laboratory in the 1980s, the development of the Korean semiconductor industry can be described as 'inspirational'.
In less than 40 years, South Korea's semiconductor industry started to grow from a deserted forest to a giant of the semiconductor industry at the start of more than a decade at the start of the United States and Japan. It was inseparable from intensive technical assistance and the government’s strength. Protection and corporate 'death'.
Precipitation: The model of 'government + big consortium'
South Korea's semiconductor industry started with technology. After about 20 years of precipitation, it completed its own technology accumulation in chip design and processing technology.
In 1959, LG's predecessor 'Kingsing Society' was developed to produce Korea's first vacuum tube radio, which is also considered to be the origin of the Korean semiconductor industry. However, at that time, Korea did not have independent production capacity, but only imported components. For assembly.
In the mid-1960s, U.S. companies such as Fairchild and Motorola began investing more and more in low-cost labor-power countries such as Southeast Asia to reduce their production costs, and South Korea benefited from this trend. Only stay at the economic level.
The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) pointed out in a report that for the subsidiaries of these U.S. investors, South Korea is only an 'enclave' and has not played any role in technological advancement in Korea. 'They only specialize in simple transistors. Assembled with ICs, used for export, required materials and production equipment are imported'.
In the 1970s, Japanese companies such as Sanyo and Toshiba began to invest in South Korea. But until the early 1980s, the semiconductor industry in South Korea was still very limited. It was a simple, labor-intensive process. Assembly node.
With the changes in market conditions in the external world in the 1970s and the increase in wages in South Korea, the export ratio of light industrial products in South Korea has dropped sharply, and foreign debt has also risen to dangerous levels. The Korean economy has been threatened.
To this end, the Korean government announced the 'Heavy Industry Promotion Program' (HCI Promotion Program) in 1973, aiming to establish a self-sufficient economy through the development of heavy industry and chemical industry. In 1975, the Korean government announced six years of supporting the semiconductor industry. The plan emphasizes the localization of electronic components and semiconductor production.
The South Korean government also organized a DRAM co-development project called 'Official and Civil One', which is to develop DRAM industry through government investment.
In the process of semiconductor industrialization, the Korean government has promoted the 'government + consortium' economic development model and promoted the efficient integration of 'funds + technology + talent'. In this process, the Korean government will also be large-scale aviation, steel, etc. Giant companies are privatized, assigned to large consortia, and provided to consortiums with measures known as 'ex-gratia'.
The Economist commented in a 1995 article that the development of South Korean industry in the 1980s benefited from the HCI promotion program. Because such a huge resource is concentrated in a few financial groups, they can quickly enter the production of capital-intensive DRAMs. And ultimately overcome the huge financial losses in the early stages of production.
Beyond: The Rise of Samsung
1983 is the historical turning point of the Korean semiconductor industry.
The entry of the Korean consortium led the semiconductor industry to enter the era of large-scale integration (VLSI) production. These included companies such as Samsung, Venus and Hyundai (later renamed Hynix Semiconductor and acquired by the SK Group). This achieved qualitative change in Korean industry. ——From simple assembly production to precise wafer processing production.
In the 1980s, Samsung and Hyundai’s consortium were all looking for the future business areas. Ultimately their goal was to transform from an industrial base to a more high-tech oriented industry. When Samsung decided to enter into large-scale integrated chip production through its electronics business. At that time, Hyundai decided to use chip production as a way to realize its diversification into the electronics industry. The subsequent participation of the Venus Agency allowed the largest three consortiums in South Korea to participate in VLSI production.
Samsung's development of the semiconductor industry is a condensed history of the Korean semiconductor industry.
The former Samsung Group CEO Lee Byung Chul decided in February 1983 to make a large-scale investment in memory chip production. This was considered a very bold decision because South Korea was still a simple assembly production base at that time, 1983. In the same year, the share of wafer processing in semiconductor manufacturing was only 4.3%.
According to Samsung’s official strategy, Samsung Electronics suffered from frequent delivery of imported chips from Japan. All of the above factors prompted Li Bingzhe to try to enter the VLSI chip business.
Samsung has developed a detailed plan according to which about 50% of Samsung's total semiconductor products should be DRAM. By focusing on carefully selected DRAM fields, economies of scale and cost competitiveness can be achieved.
Later, SST International was established in Silicon Valley and became a technology outpost for Samsung. SST International (renamed with Tristar Semiconductor Co., Ltd.) made significant contributions to Samsung's product development, and the products successfully developed by SST International were transferred to Korea. The parent company SST, used for mass production, plays a crucial role in Samsung's technology development.
In 1983, Samsung built its first chip factory in the Gyeongsang district of Gyeonggi-do, and began the following series of actions. Samsung Electronics first purchased Micron from the company at the time of funding problems (47.58, 0.96, 2.06%). 64K DRAM technology, processing technology was acquired from Sharp Corporation of Japan. In addition, Samsung also obtained Sharp's 'Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor Process' license agreement.
In this process, Samsung and other Korean companies have become familiar with the incremental process innovation, combined with long experience in reverse engineering aspects of these companies, South Korea's semiconductor industry has entered the fast lane.
Shortly after selecting DRAM as the main product, Samsung successfully developed 64K DRAM in November 1983. Technically, the Korean semiconductor industry has achieved a significant leap from relatively simple LSI technology to cutting-edge VLSI technology. Thus, 1983 South Korea marked the beginning of an era of VLSI chips. It is undeniable that, in the initial stage, the licensing of foreign technology played a crucial role in the Samsung product development.
Subsequently, Samsung Electronics established a modern chip factory in 1984 for the mass production of 64K DRAM. It was exported to the United States for the first time in the autumn of 1984. It successfully developed 1M DRAM in 1985 and achieved Intel's 'Microprocessor Technology'. agreement.
Since then, Samsung has continued to invest in DRAM, and the Korean government has also fully cooperated. By the Korean Institute of Electronic Communications' KIST, led by the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) management, in conjunction with Samsung, LG, Hyundai and South Korea's six universities, 'official “Industry and Academies” have been working together on 4M DRAM technology. The project lasted for three years, R&D expenses reached US$110 million, and the Korean government took up 57%. The Korean government also promoted a cooperative development project for 16M/64M DRAM.
In the 'Semiconductor Industry Revitalization Plan' implemented from 1983 to 1987, the South Korean government invested a total of 346 million U.S. dollars in loans and inspired 2 billion U.S. dollars in private investment, which greatly promoted the development of the Korean semiconductor industry.
In 1987, another opportunity appeared in the world semiconductor market, which originated from the semiconductor trade conflict between the United States and Japan and the subsequent political regulation. After 1985, the increase in Japanese DRAM makers’ market share was considered as a sacrifice of the United States. In the interests of producers, the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan are increasing.
Japan first announced the implementation of the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) with foreign semiconductor manufacturers, and the United States government announced in March 1987 that it imposed anti-dumping duties and retaliatory measures on Japanese products containing Japanese chips.
In the end, Japan promised to increase chip prices by reducing DRAM production. However, the growth in demand in the US computer industry at the time caused a serious shortage of 256K DRAM in the global market. This provided an important window of opportunity for Korean 256K DRAM manufacturers.
Since then, South Korea has been catching up. Samsung completed 4M DRAM chip design in 1988, R & D faster than Japan 6 months later, and then Samsung took advantage of Japan's economic bubble burst, Toshiba, NEC and other giants significantly reduce semiconductor investment opportunities, increase investment , The introduction of Japanese technical personnel. And in 1992 developed the world's first 64M DRAM, more than Japan NEC, becoming the world's largest DRAM manufacturer.
Gambler: Countercyclical Investment
Going beyond Japan to become the world’s largest DRAM maker is just the first step for Samsung to lead the Korean semiconductor industry to the world’s top echelon.
After 1995, Samsung launched many 'anti-period law' price wars, making most of the DRAM manufacturers go bankrupt, and gradually formed the status of only a few monopoly markets in the DRAM field.
Lin Jianhong, a research manager at Jibang Consulting's Tuobai Industrial Research Institute, told 21st Century Business Herald that the semiconductor industry needs to invest a lot of capital expenditure every year for the development of equipment and technology. Samsung is an integrated company type, even if the memory market is sluggish, it can still be Through other business departments to inject funds. This makes Samsung gradually become a semiconductor industry giant.
For example, when Samsung introduced 64K DRAM in 1984, the global semiconductor industry entered a downturn, and the memory price plunged from US$4 to 30 cents per tablet. Samsung’s current production cost was US$1.3 per tablet, which means that each Selling a piece of memory Samsung will lose a dollar.
At the low tide, Intel withdrew from the DRAM industry, and Japanese companies such as NEC significantly reduced capital expenditures. Samsung, like the gambler, was generally crazy overclocking, investing in counter-cyclical investments, continuing to expand production capacity, and developing larger-capacity DRAMs.
By the end of 1986, Samsung Semiconductor had accumulated a loss of US$300 million, and the equity capital was completely in short supply. However, the turnaround took an immediate turn. In 1987, the signing of the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement made DRAM memory prices rise. Samsung also filled the gaps in global semiconductor market demand. Profit, from the contrarian in the past.
From 1996 to 1999, Samsung once again resorted to the 'anti-period law', but Hitachi, NEC, Mitsubishi's memory department was overwhelmed, was stripped by the parent company, and Toshiba announced that it will no longer produce general-purpose DRAM since July 2002. , Japan's DRAM only left Elpida.
For example, at the beginning of 2007, due to the global DRAM demand surplus, superimposed the 2008 financial crisis, the price of DRAM particles plummeted from US$2.25 to US$0.31. Samsung used 118% of the company’s total profit in 2007 for DRAM production expansion, which caused DRAM prices to fall further. Break cash costs and material costs.
In this offensive, the German manufacturer Qimonda declared bankruptcy in early 2009. Japanese manufacturer Elpida declared bankruptcy in early 2012. Samsung's market share further increased. The giants in the global DRAM sector only have Samsung, Hynix and Micron.
The impact of this price war is still continuing. DRAM has been in the period of stable stock-shortening prices from the second half of 2016 to the first quarter of 2018. During this period, Samsung’s chip sales reached 69 billion U.S. dollars, becoming the largest in the world. Chip makers.
In an interview with 21st Century Business Herald on May 3rd, Wang Yanhui, Secretary-General of the China Semiconductor Investment Union, stated that when the brand development was not smooth, South Korean companies such as Samsung did not think that they would need to go to OEM, but continued to invest. This is the reason why South Korea is able to produce global leading chip brands such as Samsung and Hynix.
How to maintain the advantages of the first tier
Wang Yanhui pointed out that South Korea's semiconductor industry is beginning with the industry transfer, under the government-led development of its own brand.
In the process of developing the semiconductor industry in South Korea, the Korean government is very supportive of the industry, investing heavily in R&D, and protecting after production.
Since 1990, the investment in the Korean semiconductor industry has risen. From the perspective of R&D investment, R&D investment in the semiconductor sector was approximately US$8.5 million in 1980 and US$900 million in 1994. Patent technology also rose from 708 at the end of 1989 to 3,336 items in 1994.
In 1994, South Korea introduced the "Semiconductor Chip Protection Act." Since then, the Korean government has also designated the chip industry and technology as the core technology that affects the country's competitiveness, and is committed to highly protecting technology and property rights.
The huge semiconductor industry has also developed Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix as its leader. IC manufacturing companies, semiconductor equipment companies and semiconductor material companies have been working in layers. The huge semiconductor industry chain constructed through outsourcing and OEM has formed the Yongren Group. , Kasei, Icheon, etc. Semiconductor industrial clusters support South Korea's semiconductor industry chain.
After Korea's semiconductor industry has entered the first echelon of the global semiconductor industry, South Korea still hopes to maintain its own advantages, not only through the 'BK21' and 'BK21+' programs, but also to provide precision, special support to universities, research institutes or institutes. In 2016, the Semiconductor Hope Fund was launched to invest in semiconductor-related companies to focus on the development of new technologies, especially the storage of new technologies.
This series of policies also basically continues the 'government + large consortium' industrial policy, encourages the integration of enterprises and universities, and nurtures talents for the chip industry to maintain South Korea's advantages in the semiconductor industry. 21st Century Business Herald
4. News Analysis: What kind of enlightenment does the growth of 'Korean core' bring?
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, May 7th News Analysis: What kind of enlightenment does the growth of 'Korean core' bring?
Xinhua News Agency reporter Peng Yu Lu Rui
The rise of the Korean semiconductor industry, represented by Samsung Electronics, has attracted the attention of the industry. The company’s financial report, which was recently released, shows that in 1717, Samsung Electronics has occupied 14.6% of the world’s semiconductor chip market, taking over Intel’s 2 5 The market's 'boss' status, and South Korea's chip industry is almost blank more than 40 years ago.
From the scratch to the top, the story of the growth of Korea Core is inspiring. Experts say that Samsung’s success is closely related to the strong financial resources and overall industrial layout under the Korean consortium, and the development of “China Core” can also be enriched. Inspiration.
The Samsung chip industry started back in the 1970s. Although Samsung started from low-tech home appliances, founder Li Bingjun realized that chips are the top priority in terms of the performance of home appliances, and he was determined to invest heavily in R&D chips. 1 9 In 1984, Samsung acquired a 50% stake in South Korea Semiconductor Corp., marking its official entry into the industry.
In the 1980s, the Korean semiconductor industry began to leapfrog. Samsung Electronics developed memory from 1983 to 1969, successfully developed 16 MDRAM (dynamic random access memory), and developed 5 generations in only 6 years. Technology. In 1949, Samsung first released the world’s first 256 MDRAM, surpassing Japan. Currently, Samsung has a complete industrial chain for the design and production of various types of semiconductor chips. In particular, its memory chips already account for 40% of the global market. % or so.
How can Samsung's chips rise rapidly from scratch?
First of all, the firm confidence and years of investment of the company's leadership have continued to provide a 'blood' for the development of the industry. Song Yonghao, a professor of integrated electronic engineering at Hanyang University in South Korea, said that the South Korean semiconductor industry has harvested the fruits that were sown after 20 years ago. From the start of Samsung’s founder Li Bingjun’s decision to develop the semiconductor chip industry strategically, to the succession of the later president Li Jianxi. Under the family-owned consortium model, corporate policy has maintained continuity no matter how the global market fluctuates.
For example, in 1968, the DRAM market price fell, US and Japanese companies successively reduced their investment, and Samsung Semiconductor reversed cyclical investment despite its loss of US$300 million. It continued to expand its production capacity, and began to make profits after the market recovered the following year. Missed opportunity.
Dr. Li Xuwu, a senior consultant of Zhijiang Laboratory Chip Center, a well-known expert in the semiconductor industry in China, said that the core of Samsung’s success is the decisiveness and continuity of R&D investment, even if the performance loss can withstand pressure. The chip market has cycles, 'China's core It can't be done overnight. Only by sticking to the end can we succeed without fear of temporary losses.
Secondly, it attaches great importance to talents, and it accumulates the 'soil' of industrial development. Samsung established an R&D center in the United States and deployed the same production equipment. It hired local talents to train local engineers. The trained engineers then returned to their headquarters. Now, Samsung The Samsung Integrated Technology Institute (SAIT) covering dozens of countries and regions around the world has been established to send talents to go abroad and also attract overseas talents.
In 2015, Samsung Electronics and Korea's Sungkyunkwan University established the Department of Semiconductor Engineering to develop semiconductor talents for South Korean semiconductor companies. In 2007, Samsung Electronics teamed up with eight partner companies to establish the Semiconductor Facility Technology Institute (SFTA). ) To cultivate talents in the semiconductor industry.
Li Xuwu said that the cooperation between Samsung and Sungkyunkwan University has sent a large number of talents to the chip industry, and the development of the 'China Core' has created a huge talent gap. He suggested training through three channels: The main channel is the training of universities, especially the training system. The interdisciplinary talents required for the chip; The introduction of core talents from overseas, chip companies can follow Samsung’s establishment of laboratories overseas; there is also a company’s electronic engineers who have undergone training to become integrated circuit design engineers.
Third, the government strongly supports the cooperation model between schools and enterprises and optimizes the environment for sustainable industrial development. After the 1980s, the Korean government began to vigorously support integrated circuit manufacturing and classified chips as the core technology that affects national competitiveness. , Talents and other aspects to provide support and provide a strong intellectual property protection mechanism. Attracted by the government, South Korean students who once studied in Europe and the United States have gradually returned home, Samsung to recruit more than 100 talents, formally build factories and mass production.
In 1979, the Korean Ministry of Education launched the 'BK 2 1' program for the construction of research universities, and provided special support for 580 universities or research institutes, and whether or not universities can be organically integrated into the company's core evaluation indicators. The university has thus set off a hot topic in semiconductors and has sent large numbers of talents to companies.
Li Xuwu believes that the academic evaluation system of universities can no longer only look at the number of papers, but also whether or not they have solved the practical problems in the industry; the industry can not only work hard and communicate with the colleges and universities in a timely manner their own practical needs. With the national project background With the support of enterprises and the stimulating of enterprises' needs, the main channel for the training of integrated personnel in universities and colleges will become wider and wider.
It is worth noting that the rise of 'Korean core' has also benefited from the US, Japan, and European chip companies gradually withdrawing from the memory chip market. Samsung has seized the opportunity to 'change overtaking'. South Korea Semiconductor Industry Association member Liu Shien said in the fourth In the era of the sub-industrial revolution, compared with Samsung’s dominant memory chips, the demand for system chips in industries such as autopilot, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence will greatly increase, and Korea has not yet taken the lead in this field. This is also true for 'China Core'. An opportunity to 'change overtaking'.
The long-standing Moore's law of the chip industry holds that: When the price does not change, the number of components that can be accommodated on an integrated circuit will double approximately every 18 to 24 months, and the performance will also double. It is believed that due to bottlenecks such as semiconductor lithography, the chip is now closer and closer to the physical limit, Moore's Law is facing failure, and the pace of technology replacement is slowing down. China's development of the integrated circuit chip industry is just the right time. Xinhua News Agency
5. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry’s immediate concern;
Trade disputes between China and the United States have been fierce and sometimes moderated; however, as of now, the strategy has also been revamped, and it is no exaggeration to say that the climax is overwhelming. In mid-April, China’s second-largest communications plant ZTE was involved in Iran and North Korea. The sale of communications equipment products was a clear violation of the US sanctions ban. The US Department of Commerce decided to ban US companies from selling heavy components to ZTE for seven years. This is a series of tariff measures that Trump has adopted to provide a more than duty tariff. A direct, fast, effective strategy. The trade dispute between China and the U.S. may not be good.
Trump has a long-term plan. Only recently did he slash to "Made in China 2025" and high-tech products. This is undoubtedly a further blow to China's high-end technology products in order to curb China's growth. ZTE's main business operations include base stations. , Optical communications and mobile phones three parts; The former two can find companies to replace or self-sufficiency, but the components of the chip must rely on the United States Qualcomm and Taiwan MediaTek supply.
Taiwan factory will be implicated in the role of OEM and supply chain for the United States to block China's ZTE and Huawei. For example, Hon Hai of the foundry, TSMC in semiconductors, MediaTek, Riyueguang, KYEC, and Yahiya Optoelectronics; Daliguang, Sipin, Compal, Inventec and other major suppliers of supply chain are difficult to avoid. After the United States issued regulations on ZTE, Taiwan’s “International Trade Bureau” began to require Taiwan’s IC design giant MediaTek to stop selling chips. ZTE, afterwards, applied for an export license for strategic high-tech goods. Mediatek's output chips are not particularly high-end strategic products, but if they are stopped selling, their performance will be affected. However, there are also public opinions that the US has taken a ban on ZTE and forced Does the Cai government have a simultaneous ban on MediaTek. Is it intended to please the Trump administration?
Nearly 30% of ZTE’s telecom equipment relies on US supply. The US ban has not only hit ZTE significantly, but has even affected the development of the mainland’s 5G network. However, Sai’ung lost the horse and knew it was not a blessing; this event is more likely to stimulate the red supply. The development of the chain. When Xi Jinping visited the Three Gorges, he stressed: "On our own efforts, we must take our "Great Power System (Chip Technology)" in our own hands. Through self-reliance, we must discard fantasy and focus on independent innovation. Ability to improve."
The mainland has started the acquisition of Midea since 2015. Last year, Ziguang Group consolidated its business and paid high-paying talents to Taiwan for semiconductors. Taiwan's Inako has nearly 100 engineers who have switched to Changjiang Storage and Hefei Chang of Ziguang Group. Xin. Apart from this, the mainland has also established the Semiconductor Fund “Big Fund” to foster the semiconductor industry’s production and technology, strengthen its own R&D chip policy, drastically reduce the taxation rate of chip manufacturers, and strive to catch up. Not only want to get rid of US control, but also want to squeeze in. The world's semiconductor powerhouse.
It cannot be denied that semiconductors have always been Taiwan’s most proud industry. Last year’s semiconductor output value was NT$2.45 trillion, ranking third in the world. It was slyly claimed that the semiconductor industry had eaten Taiwan for 30 years. With the rapid rise of mainland semiconductors and the strong enemies of South Korea, Taiwan Semiconductor still has a few years of experience. Taiwan's semiconductor design from the upstream IC, wafer foundry in the middle reaches to downstream packaging testing can be said to have a complete supply chain. Although the mainland has invested large sums of money to carry out global mergers and acquisitions, it has been difficult to surpass Taiwan for a year and a half, but it has already threatened Taiwan. Some people say that Taiwan Semiconductor has a five-year history, but five years later? Sino-US trade friction with ZTE However, delaying the fire has also reminded Taiwan that once the semiconductor industry loses its advantages, Taiwan’s key industries are in jeopardy.